SOMALIA

Imperial partition
Siab barre scientific socialism
Problem of national integration
Challenge to the regime
Repressives measures
Issaq oppression

S.N.M

Isaaq Insurgency in Somalia 1982-1988
Somali National Movement
The Republic of Somaliland Today
 
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The Somali National Movement, Leaders: Ahmad Mahammad Culaid, Ahmad Ismaaiil Abdi, Abdulqaadir Kosar Abdi, Ahmad Mahammad Mahamuud "Silanyo"

The Somali National Movement

Prior to January 1991

The SNM was founded more-or-less simultaneously by different groups of individuals in Saudi Arabia, Mogadishu, and London. The groups in Saudi Arabia and Mogadishu sent delegates to London for making the formal proclamation of the founding of their movement in April of 1981.

The founding committee in London consisted of the following members:

Ahmed Mohamed Gulaid ("Jimaleh") was the President of this group and became the first Chairman of the SNM,
Hassan Adan Wadadeed (Vice President)
Ahmed Ismael
Mohamed Hashi Elmi
Abdisalan
Said

Since its founding, the SNM has had 5 democratically-elected Chairmen, as follows:

  1. Ahmed Mohamed Gulaid ('Jimaleh') (Habar Awal clan),
  2. Yusuf Sheikh Ali Sheikh Madar (Habar Awal clan),
  3. Abdulkadir Kosar Abdi (Habar Yunis clan),
  4. Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud ('Silanyo') (Habar Jeclo clan), and
  5. Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali ('Tuur') (Habar Yunis clan).

'Silanyo' served by far the longest as Chairman. The last Chairman, 'Tuur', is the current President of the Republic of Somaliland.

The SNM has been reasonably broad based, composed mainly of

The highest-ranking non-Isaq member of the SNM was the Vice-Chairman under 'Silanyo', Mr. Ali Mohamed Ossoble ("Wardhigley") – is a Hawiye. As of around 1984, there were a substantial number of members in the SNM from the Dir, Hawiye, and Isaq groups of clans living in the former Italian Somalia, showing a broad geographical as well as clan base at that time.

The driving force has been the unified desire to oppose the oppressive socialist dictatorship of General Barre, rather than to support any particular clans, such as the Isaq clans that provided the largest fraction of its membership. Therefore, it collected intellectuals with a wide variety of political views who shared this common goal. There was a longer-term desire to stop the oppression from the central government in Mogadishu as well as to decentralize much of the power of that government. However, the short-term motivation of stopping the growing genocide of the Isaq group of clans by General Barre focused the goals of the SNM on a narrower clan basis.

In sharp contrast to other liberation movements at that time, the SNM did make a serious effort to use internal democratic procedures to develop political goals based upon an internal consensus – and to publish them. Following is a typical statement published in 1981:

"We propose a new political system built on Somali cultural values of co-operation rather than coercion; a system which elevates the Somali concept of 'Xeer' or inter-family social contract in which no man exercised political power over another except according to established law and custom, to the national level."

Among 11 guidelines also published at that time, the following may be of particular interest:

1 "The structure of the central and regional government will be as simple as possible. They will be designed to reduce hierarchy and bureaucracy to a minimum and enable the average man and woman to understand and relate to regional and national governments;"
2 "It will integrate effectively traditional Somali egalitarianism and the requirement of good central government;"
3 "It will maximize the effectiveness of the representative and democratic process at all levels;" and
9 "The freedom of the press in accordance with the constitution and the laws of the country will be guaranteed by law;" ooo

Rather than to try to expand further to include members from even more clans and groups of clans, it assisted the Hawiyes in forming their USC and the Ogadenis in forming their SPM as sister liberation movements in the fight to oust the socialist dictatorship of General Barre in the war-of-liberation.

In 1982, the Executive Committee of the SNM moved from London to Addis Ababa. This was prompted by oppressive actions of the dictatorship in Hargeisa in February 1992 as well as the desertions of many senior army officers to the SNM in Ethiopia.

Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia also supported the SNM at the beginning, for the same reasons as he supported the SSDF earlier. There were some jealousies between the SSDF and the SNM, whereby the SSDF tried to force the SNM to join it and the SNM refused. Ultimately, Colonel Mengistu dropped the SSDF and sided with the SNM. However the SNM was never as cooperative as the SSDF had been, refusing to take orders from the Ethiopian Dictatorship and refusing to accept the "Green Book" of Colonel Qaddafi as the pre-requisite for receiving financial and military aid from him.5

One of the 3 parties of the Tripartite Agreement (Ethiopia, Libya, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) did come to the direct aid of the SNM. Namely, Yemen armed the first 500 militiamen of the SNM so that they could start operations across the border in Somalia. This enabled them to carry out spectacular raids in 1982, such as freeing over 1000 political prisoners in the Mandera Prison and freeing Colonel Abdillahi Askar and other captive SNM officials in Hargeisa just before they were to be executed in public.

In exasperation with its lack of knowledge of what the SNM was doing, at a time when Ethiopia wanted to have better control over the SNM, the Ethiopian Commander at Harar negotiated an agreement with the Commander of the SNM militia in 1984, Colonel Mohamoud Sheekh ('Shine'). The SNM agreed to give the Ethiopian Government better information about its operations and the Ethiopian Government agreed to give the SNM practically all of the logistical support that it needed.

General Barre was extremely irritated by the growing number of Hawiyes joining the SNM and the fact that the Vice Chairman was a Hawiye. He did succeed in creating a conflict between the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SNM so that the Vice Chairman, Ali Mohamed Ossoble ('Wardhigley') finally resigned. Other foreign countries appear to have cooperated with General Barre in developing the theory that since the SSDF had stopped their armed resistance to General Barre, only the SNM was left. If the SNM could be induced to give up their armed struggle, there would be no more conflict and opposition to General Barre. Despite the various bribes offered, the SNM refused to stop in its war-of-liberation. Many other leading Hawiye members of the SNM also left the SNM in 1987 as a result of this episode.

In April 1988, Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia struck a peace deal with General Barre, to their mutual convenience, whereby each agreed to stop supporting the liberation movements based in their countries and launching raids in the other country. The basic idea was to force the SNM to withdraw from the border, deeper into Ethiopia, from where they would not be able to launch any more raids across the border. However, with the "rug pulled out from under their feet", the SNM went in the other direction and moved its militias to within Somalia. In a surprise attack, they captured Burao and most of Hargeisa on 27 and 30 May 1988 respectively. This led to a rapid escalation in the intensity of the war-of-liberation on both sides.

The reactions of the Barre regime were oppressive, including bombing the major cities and villages in the North and extra-judicial executions of large number of innocent civilians. This led to popular uprisings and military defections throughout the whole of Somalia.

It is relevant to note that during this period, the top leadership of the SSDF defected from their political base by joining forces with General Barre, while their political base continued to oppose General Barre. Nominally, the majority of the leaders of the Majerteens, Dhulbahantes, and Warsangelis (all Darods) living on both sides of the border between the Republic of Somaliland and the former Italian Somalia were on the side of General Barre. However, large numbers of individuals at the grass roots level, such as intellectuals and officers, continued to fight against General Barre, in parallel with or together with the SNM, such as by joining the SNM in 1988. This may help to explain why the vast majority of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli residents of the Republic of Somaliland today support independence for their Republic of Somaliland, whereas very small cliques of elite leaders have cooperated with other members of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans living in the South near Kismayo to form the very small USP faction that opposes independence for the Republic of Somaliland today.

The SNM and its militias did most of the fighting in the war-of-liberation against the socialist dictatorship through the 1980's. Only at the end, in the last 1 to 1 1/2 years, did it receive substantial assistance from the USC and SPM in the South.

After January 1991

Immediately after defeating the military forces of General Barre in January 1991, the SNM called a meeting in March 1991 of the Elders of all non-Issaq clans in the former British Somaliland to reconcile any potential differences between them and the Isaq clans – as agreed upon by all liberation movements before the end of the war-of-liberation.

The SNM then met with the Elders of the Isaq group of clans in the middle of April 1991 in Hargeisa.

They called a Congress of the SNM at the end of April, together with representatives of all clans, Isaq and non-Isaq. This Guurti Congress of the Elders and other democratically-selected representatives forced the SNM, against its will, to announce the creation of the independent Republic of Somaliland on 16 May 1881.

Despite some embarrassing exceptions, the SNM has generally done an outstanding job in restoring respect for the human rights of minorities within its midst. Even the Human Rights Bureau of the US State Department has recognized this achievement, even though the rest of the US State Department is opposed to the SNM because of its insistence upon independence for its new secular democracy.

The SNM has evolved from a liberation movement into a political party, representing primarily the interests of the Isaq group of clans – even though a substantial number of its members and supporters are still from the non-Isaq clans in the RSL. It plays a dominate role in the current civilian democratic Government, since the Isaq people make up about 66% of the total population , but the Government also has important members from all major non-Isaq clans. In the first Cabinet, 4 of the 18 Ministers were from non-Isaq clans, i.e. 78% Isaq and 22% non-Isaq. The Central Committee of the SNM that was elected at their National Conference in March/April 1990 had 19 out of 90 members as non-Isaqs, i.e. 21%. To a certain extent, weakness in this Government since its inception in May 1991 reflects weakness and confusion within the SNM itself as a political party.

The militia of the SNM has also declined in importance since the war-of-liberation ended successfully. Due to a total lack of funding for the Government of the RSL, it has not been able to implement its plans to consolidate its militias into a national military force and then to systematically demobilize this national military force. Without funding to feed or pay its militiamen itself, its militia has fragmented into many smaller militias, each associated with a subclan that feeds them. Although fragmented and disorganized, these many militias do control much of the countryside of the RSL and provide general law-and-order – although they are continuing to have serious difficulties in restraining criminal gangs, such as from highway robbery.

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